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Standing in the Way of Cooperation: 
Citizen Standing and Compliance with 
Environmental Agreements 
Neil Gormley* 
I. Introduction
As governments increasingly have recognized that durable solutions to
environmental problems require international approaches, efforts at 
international cooperation have proliferated.  Today, cross-border pollution, 
global climate change, and species loss form part of a long list of 
environmental ills that put a premium on coordination between states. 
Moreover, as the regulatory decisions of one state increasingly affect others 
via the price of traded goods and international capital flows, environmental 
problems formerly viewed as purely domestic have taken on global 
significance.1 
Recognition of the transnational character of these problems has 
found its way into the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA invoked the history of 
multilateral efforts to combat climate change and assessed the significance 
of U.S. automobile emissions as a share of total global emissions of carbon 
dioxide.  The Court concluded that the U.S. automobile industry made a 
“meaningful contribution” to global greenhouse gas concentrations and, 
ultimately, that this was sufficient for the petitioners - a coalition of states 
and environmental groups that sought to force the EPA to regulate carbon 
dioxide under the Clean Air Act - to establish standing to sue.2  Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for himself and three other dissenters, likewise considered 
the global character of climate change, yet the conclusions he drew were 
starkly different.3  For these dissenters, the need for international 
coordination tended to defeat the plaintiffs’ standing: Because U.S. 
emissions cuts might not be matched by other countries - because, in other 
* J.D., 2009, Harvard Law School.
1. See Neil Gormley, Online Student Note, Safeguarding National Environmental
Regulation in a Liberalized World: Beyond the Trade Promotion Act of 2002, HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.hlpronline.com/Gormley_Student_Note.pdf. 
2. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
3. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
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words, efforts at coordination may fail - the plaintiffs could not establish 
that a judicial remedy would redress their injuries.4  In effect, these justices 
insist that climate change and other global environmental problems are 
nonjusticiable.5  That is, they are questions for the political branches, not 
the judiciary.6 
Even though the ineffectiveness of unilateral efforts was a major 
component of the Chief Justice’s dissent, little notice has been paid - in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, or elsewhere - to the effect that standing doctrine may 
have on the ability of the United States to coordinate effectively with other 
nations in dealing with climate change and other global environmental 
problems.  This paper sets out to explore the possibility that domestic 
judicial enforcement of global environmental agreements tends to 
strengthen efforts at international coordination, and thereby suggests a 
deep irony in Chief Justice Roberts’ argument.  For the Chief Justice, the 
absence of international coordination defeats standing.  But a strict doctrine 
of standing may itself hinder international coordination.7 
The argument proceeds in three parts.  I begin by summarizing the 
current state of constitutional standing doctrine as it relates to 
environmental problems, and identify the risk that strict standing 
requirements will decrease the prospects for effective enforcement of 
environmental laws.  I then explore the link between citizen suits and 
compliance with international environmental agreements, and suggest that 
doctrinal developments that restrict citizen enforcement - including but 
perhaps not limited to new standing obstacles - will hinder compliance. 
Finally, I argue that the availability of domestic enforcement will bolster the 
credibility of U.S. commitments, ultimately strengthening the U.S. 
government’s hand in international negotiations. 
II. Standing at a Crossroads
The core requirements of standing, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,8 are derived from the “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III of the Constitution, and as such are 
now generally assumed to be beyond the power of Congress to modify by 
4. Id. at 544-46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. The petitioners themselves pointed out a similar circularity in the
dissenters’ reasoning, suggesting that a favorable outcome in their lawsuit would 
increase the likelihood of emissions regulation by China and India.  See id. at 544.  My 
argument about standing, I will attempt to show, implicates questions of 
institutional design that are both more durable and relevant to a wider range of 
international problems. 
8. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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statute.9  The Constitution requires that a plaintiff allege “personal injury 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to 
be redressed by the requested relief.”10  Thus, Article III standing is 
commonly understood to have three mandatory components: injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability. 
The doctrine of standing is intended to preserve the adversarial nature 
of the litigation process “by assuring . . . that the parties before the court 
have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome.”11  Lujan, 
however, resurrects private law notions of injury that are not only ancillary 
to the stated goal of ensuring vigorous prosecution of lawsuits, but also are 
largely incompatible with the modern statutory approach to environmental 
regulation.12  Fundamentally, this incompatibility derives from the fact that 
modern environmental law sets out to regulate the few in order to vindicate 
the interest of the many in preservation of a public good - a clean 
environment.  The Lujan approach to standing tends to prevent the intended 
beneficiaries of environmental regulation - citizens generally - from 
enforcing these statutorily created rights.13  It does so in at least three ways. 
First, Lujan defines the necessary injury in such a way that the values 
that environmental litigation generally seeks to protect are difficult to 
conceptualize as injuries.  Whereas earlier decisions had focused the 
standing inquiry on whether the plaintiff had suffered a legal wrong,14 
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp15 opened the door for the 
reinsertion of a factual conception of injury from the common law.  Lujan 
tied this factual inquiry more closely to private law notions: a 
constitutionally sufficient “injury-in-fact” must be “concrete and 
particularized” and must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way.”16  
The difficulty that meeting this concreteness requirement poses for 
environmental plaintiffs is evident from even a cursory examination of the 
cases that have reached the Supreme Court.  Though the Supreme Court 
9. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992). 
10. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
11. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12. See generally, Robert V. Percival, Greening the Constitution - Harmonizing
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL L. 809 (2002). 
13. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion warned expressly that standing served to
exclude beneficiaries of regulation more readily than the subjects of it.  Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 562 (“Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government 
action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”). 
14. See Percival, supra note 12 at 827-28.
15. 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970),
16. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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conceded in Sierra Club v. Morton17 that aesthetic injuries may be sufficient to 
satisfy Article III, the Court has repeatedly raised the bar for establishing 
that an aesthetic injury is sufficiently concrete.  Thus, in Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Foundation, the Court held that recreating in the vicinity of affected 
public lands is insufficient to establish a concrete injury where the public 
lands at issue are expansive.18  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife highlighted these 
difficulties in the context of environmental harms that cross national 
borders.  There, the injury was not sufficiently concrete because plaintiffs 
who worked with endangered species in Egypt that would be wiped out by 
flooding had not specified when exactly they next planned on visiting them.19  
Holdings like this one prompt the question: What possible interest could be 
served by a requirement that environmental groups purchase plane tickets 
before bringing suit?  The lines that the court draws between aesthetic 
injuries that count and aesthetic injuries that do not seem to have little if 
anything to do with the ostensible goal of safeguarding the adversarial 
process, and a great deal more to do with vestigial notions of what would 
have constituted injury at common law. 
The second obstacle that Lujan presents to the effective vindication of 
environmental claims is the requirement that injury in fact be, not just 
concrete, but actual or imminent.20  Limiting standing to actual or imminent 
environmental harms is deeply at odds with core rationales of 
environmental regulation.  Environmental concerns often involve long time 
horizons, nonlinear feedback, catastrophic and irreversible harms, and high 
degrees of uncertainty.21  When standing excludes claims under 
environmental statutes until environmental harms are actual or imminent, 
the potential for the judiciary to play an important role in the enforcement 
of environmental laws is seriously undermined.22  These concerns apply with 
equal or greater force when the environmental problem at issue is one of 
international scope.  When the environmental harms are not local, but 
global, the disconnect between the regulated action and the felt harm tends 
to be greater, both temporally and geographically.23  Moreover, global 
markets allocate environmental goods and services in such a way that even 
localized environmental catastrophes will tend to occur simultaneously, 
17. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
18. 497 U.S. 871, 886-89 (1990).
19. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
20. Id. at 560.
21. See generally Robert Nadeau, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENDGAME (Rutgers Univ.
Press 2006).  
22. Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 494 (2008), emphasizes this incongruity in arguing for an approach to standing 
that is more consonant with the precautionary principle. 
23. Climate change is an obvious example. See Evan Mills, Insurance in a
Climate of Change, SCIENCE, August 2005, at 1040-44. 
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rather than in successive, and thus cautionary, crises.24  The environmental 
harms that international environmental agreements are most likely to be 
concerned with, therefore, are perhaps the least likely to qualify as actual or 
imminent. 
The second and third prongs of the test for Article III standing - 
causation and redressability - may also pose problems for plaintiffs seeking 
to vindicate environmental claims.  When dealing with complex 
environmental phenomena, lines of causation can be extremely difficult to 
prove.  If plaintiffs were required to establish that particular instances of 
non-enforcement of laws, for example, were causally linked to the concrete 
harms that they rely on to establish injury in fact, large numbers of citizen 
suits would never make it out of the gate.  But the treatment of these 
requirements in environmental cases is somewhat confused, primarily 
because of the relaxation of these requirements for so-called “procedural 
injuries.”25  As Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence, “Congress has 
the power to [articulate] chains of causation that will give rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before.”26  But in Lujan, as elsewhere, it was 
unclear whether failure to consult under the Endangered Species Act 
constituted a “procedural injury” and, if not, why not.  A majority of the 
Court joined Justice Scalia’s assertion that the plaintiffs were required to 
establish causation and redressability, but only a plurality concluded that 
they failed in doing so.  The imprecisely defined exception for procedural 
injuries is further evidence of the atavism of Lujan’s approach to 
constitutional standing: the exception is an implicit recognition that private 
law notions of injury and causation are fundamentally incompatible with 
Congress’s approach to environmental regulation.  
There is additional uncertainty surrounding the requirement that an 
injury not be generalized or widespread.  In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, Inc., the Court explained, “we have declined to 
grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized 
grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially equal 
measure.”27   The Court subsequently clarified that, at least where a suit 
concerns a procedural injury, “the fact that a political forum may be more 
readily available where an injury is widely shared . . . does not, by itself, 
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.”28  Given the 
tentative phrasing of the conclusion, however, and the fact that it does 
24. HERMAN DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 164-66 (1996).
25. Justice Scalia’s enigmatic “footnote 7” concedes that standing
requirements are loosened for procedural injuries, but makes not attempt to define 
the term.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 7. 
26. Id. at 580.
27. 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
28. Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
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appear to be in some tension with the requirement that an injury in fact be 
“particularized” and “personal,” some uncertainty persisted as to whether 
diffuse harms are enough to satisfy Article III standing.  What does seem 
clear is that courts are still free to decline to exercise jurisdiction, on 
prudential grounds, in such circumstances.29  Given that environmental 
harms, especially when they stem from problems of global scope, are often 
highly diffuse,30 it is clear that the resolution of this question bears closely 
on the enforceability of environmental laws. 
This was, broadly speaking, the state of standing doctrine when 
Massachusetts v. EPA was decided.  In that opinion, the four dissenters hewed 
close to Lujan in applying a very strict test for standing.  They argued that 
petitioners lacked standing for several independently sufficient reasons: the 
global scope of climate change defeated the requirement of particularized 
injury; the uncertainty surrounding predictions of rising sea levels rendered 
the claimed injury “conjecture”; and automobile emissions standards would 
not redress the asserted injury, because the contribution of U.S. autos to 
global concentrations of greenhouse gases was too small.31 
As noted, a majority of five justices disagreed, holding there that the 
state of Massachusetts had established standing based on the global-
warming-induced injuries that it alleged.32  So did Massachusetts v. EPA signal 
a sea change in the law of standing?  Three years later, several key questions 
remain unanswered.  
Perhaps most fundamentally, Massachusetts v. EPA throws into sharp 
relief the mismatch between the types of private law injuries that are 
cognizable for standing purposes and the nature of modern environmental 
problems.  While scientists and politicians alike are focused on the globe-
spanning, macroscopic, and potentially catastrophic harms threatened by 
climate change, the Supreme Court of the United States is bound by its own 
doctrine of standing to focus on a few inches of Massachusetts coastline. 
And the Massachusetts decision made no headway in resolving the apparent 
absurdity.  Because Justice Stevens’ majority opinion relied on the loss of 
this property interest to rising oceans (which process it accepted as having 
already begun), it is hard to see Massachusetts v. EPA as a hard case with 
respect to concreteness of the injury or imminence of the injury.  Future 
environmental plaintiffs, therefore, will be bound by the same old rules. 
Less clear is whether Massachusetts v. EPA puts to rest concerns that 
diffuse or widespread injuries fall short of Article III.  Stevens declares that 
29. See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to
None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2005). 
30. See Jon Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition for Redress of the
Environment, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 321, 331 (2001). 
31. 549 U.S. at 540-46 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
32. Id. at 535.
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the fact that “climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize 
Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation,”33 but then goes on 
to explain that the Commonwealth owns “a substantial portion” of the 
states’ coastal property.  Subsequent cases could presumably distinguish 
Massachusetts v. EPA where a private plaintiff, unlike the state of 
Massachusetts, possesses no greater aesthetic or property interest than 
other members of the public.  Nor does Summers v. Earth Island Institute, a 
2009 decision on the standing of environmental plaintiffs, resolve the 
question.34  There, the Court concluded that no plaintiff had alleged an 
injury that was “concrete,” so there was no need to assess whether the injury 
was “particularized.”35  In any event, the notion of “concreteness” may yet 
prove sufficiently malleable to accommodate some justices’ distaste for 
standing rooted in widespread injuries. 
Where the Massachusetts v. EPA majority seems to depart most sharply 
from the restrictive approach of Lujan is in assessing causation and 
redressability.  First, they adopt an expansive reading of the “procedural 
injury” exception that was alluded to in earlier cases.  They accept the 
general citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, § 7607(b)(1), which 
authorizes suits to compel agency action unlawfully withheld, as a qualifying 
statutory articulation of a procedural injury36 - a holding that should have 
broad application to several environmental statutes.  Second, they 
expansively read the precedents governing the extent to which causation 
and redressability requirements are relaxed in such cases, declaring that a 
“litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief 
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly 
harmed the litigant.”37  They go on to make clear that, at least in procedural 
injury cases, it is enough for standing that the requested relief would 
constitute an incremental step towards redressing the injury complained of.38  
All of these moves towards liberalization, however, come with a major 
caveat: they may be limited to suits by states parens patriae.  In order - it is 
widely assumed39 - to secure a fifth vote in the form of Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Stevens begins his standing analysis by invoking a case from 1907 
concerning a suit by the state of Georgia on behalf of its residents.  He 
concludes that Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its “quasi-sovereign 
33. Id. at 522.
34. 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
35. Id.
36. 549 U.S. at 517-18.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 524.
39. See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v.
EPA, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2007). 
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interests” entitles it to “special solicitude” in questions of standing.40 
The million-dollar question, therefore, is whether the Massachusetts 
approach to standing extends to private plaintiffs, like environmental 
groups,41 and, more specifically, whether Justice Kennedy would support 
such an extension of the holding.  The most recent case on the Article III 
standing of environmental plaintiffs, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, sheds no 
light on that question.  There, because the Court determined that the 
plaintiffs had suffered no concrete injury, it did not reach causation and 
redressability.42   
Some have questioned the durability of Kennedy’s “defection” to the 
liberal wing of the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA,43 especially in light of his 
vote two months later in National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, a case where a highly restricted reading of the Endangered Species 
Act was adopted by five justices, Kennedy among them.44  And his 
concurrence in Lujan is susceptible to widely different interpretations.45  
While Justice Kennedy contemplates a greater role for Congress defining 
injuries in fact for purposes of Article III standing than does Justice Scalia, 
the cases to date give little hint of his view of the scope of that 
Congressional power.46  Perhaps the conclusion that can most confidently be 
drawn from Massachusetts v. EPA is that “the Justices are even more sharply 
split over foundational principles of the regulatory state than they were 
before the addition of the Court’s two newest members,”47 with Justice 
Kennedy situated somewhere in between the warring camps. 
The Supreme Court’s approach to standing, therefore, raises serious 
questions about the viability of a bedrock of U.S. environmental law - the 
citizen suit.  Cass Sunstein concluded in the wake of Lujan that “[i]t is now 
40. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
41. Compare Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73, 115 (“Justice Stevens makes plain that Massachusetts 
affects Defenders’ framework directly and suggests that the new analysis should not 
be limited to cases involving state petitioners.”) with Stevenson, supra note 32 at 74 
(“By conferring special litigation status on the state [Attorneys General], the Court 
diminished the litigation role of private activist groups by comparison.”). 
42. 129 S.Ct. at 1151.
43. See Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s
Growing Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 143-44. 
44. 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
45. See Sunstein, supra note 9 at 201 (calling Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence
“somewhat ambiguous”). 
46. See Earth Island, 129 S.Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring), in which Justice
Kennedy suggests obliquely that Congress’s power to “identify” concrete interests 
does not extend to converting “procedural” injuries into “concrete” injuries.  These 
categories, one assumes, would remain for the courts to define. 
47. Percival, supra note 43, at 112.
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apparently the law that Article III forbids Congress from granting standing to 
‘citizens’ to bring suit.”48  
At the very least, as we have seen, these developments in standing 
doctrine will make the burdens on citizens and environmental groups more 
onerous.  I will argue in Part II that standing doctrine may someday present 
insuperable obstacles to citizen suit enforcement with respect to 
international environmental problems that are yet to be comprehensively 
addressed under U.S. law.  
The growing doctrinal obstacles to the enforcement of federal 
environmental law via citizen suit are not, of course, strictly confined to 
Article III standing.  A wide range of justiciability doctrines deter and weaken 
environmental citizen suits, including the Administrative Procedure Act’s bar 
on “programmatic” challenges to agency action, announced in Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation,49 and the arcane distinctions in Norton v. SUWA 
between agency “action” and agency “inaction” for purposes of determining 
whether the APA permits suit.50  
Perhaps the most prominent of these developments is the Court’s 2008 
decision in Winter v. NRDC, which raised the bar for even successful 
environmental plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief.51  In Winter, the Court 
decided that the balance of the equities and the public interest weighed 
against granting a preliminary injunction to environmental groups seeking 
to force the Navy to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.52  
Particularly in the way it characterized the harms to be balanced in that 
inquiry - considering the risk of a national security incident but holding the 
environmental plaintiffs to a standard of actual, documented, past harm to 
wildlife - the Court took an approach to balancing that seemed 
systematically to disadvantage environmental plaintiffs.  
Interestingly, there were echoes of the Court’s environmental standing 
jurisprudence in its balancing-of-the-harms analysis in Winter.  Though 
NEPA is a procedural statute, the court did not consider or weigh any 
procedural harms on the side of the environmental plaintiffs, focusing 
instead on the types of harms that environmental plaintiffs traditionally 
have had to rely on to establish standing - individualized scientific, 
recreational and aesthetic harms.53  At oral argument, Justice Scalia went so 
far as to evoke explicitly the requirements of Article III standing in the 
48. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 166.
49. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
50. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
51. 129 S.Ct. 365 (2008)
52. Id. at 378.
53. Id. at 377.
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discussion of what harms count for purposes of equitable injunctions.54  
Thus Winter may yet provide a new opening for reinserting common law 
conceptions of injury into these complex regulatory disputes.55   
Perhaps most significantly, Winter also announced that a district court 
would abuse its discretion in granting an injunction to the environmental 
groups even if they ultimately prevailed on the merits.56  Winter thus appears 
to represent another significant obstacle in the path of environmental 
groups trying to force executive compliance with the law. 
Importantly, however, the decisions in National Wildlife Federation, Norton 
v. SUWA and Winters are not constitutional.  Given sufficient political will,
Congress can smooth those obstacles to environmental citizen suits by
amending the Administrative Procedure Act and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(a), governing preliminary injunctions.  Because the core of
Article III standing doctrine is, by contrast, beyond the capacity of Congress
to alter by statute, standing decisions are likely to impose the steepest costs
in enforcement of environmental law in the future.
This cost to effective enforcement should be borne in mind as courts 
decide whether to embark down any of the several avenues that exist for 
reconciling Article III standing and environmental citizen suits.  First, courts 
can opt to extend the Massachusetts approach to causation and redressability 
to all plaintiffs, rather than confining it to states.  They also might 
accommodate citizen suits by indulging in some slight of hand concerning 
the nature of the injury that is required.  Courts have shown themselves 
willing, in the past, to sidestep standing difficulties by simply redefining the 
injury.57  Thus, in Laidlaw, a “reasonable fear” of illness stemming from toxic 
emissions was enough to confer standing.58  A generous application of the 
“reasonable fear” approach could go a long way towards getting 
54. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24; see generally Christopher Kendall,
Dangerous Waters? The Future of Irreparable Harm Under NEPA after Winter v. NRDC, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109 (2009). 
55. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, by contrast, recognized that NEPA is
concerned with safeguarding an important procedural value - that informed weighing 
of environmental consequences precede major government actions.  See Winter, 129 
S.Ct. at 383.  See also the more extensive discussion of importance of considering
procedural harms in equitable balancing in an opinion written by then Judge Breyer
of the 1st Circuit,Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 947 (1st Cir. 1983).
56. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381.
57. Cass Sunstein analogizes to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), where an applicant to a medical program could not establish that 
affirmative action was the reason for his rejection.  The Court ruled that he had 
standing by recharacterizing his injury as denial of a chance to compete on an equal 
footing with other applicants.  Sunstein, supra note 9, at 203-04.  To some extent, of 
course, this begged the question whether the affirmative action program was 
unlawful in the first place. 
58. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv,. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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environmental groups into court.  Finally, the most accommodating way 
forward, by far, would be to recognize the power of Congress to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation free from the constraints of the 
common law. 
III. The Problem of Compliance
The ability of citizens to access courts in order to compel executive
compliance with environmental laws may have important repercussions on 
the international plane, because domestic enforcement bears on one of the 
most fundamental questions in the design of international environmental 
agreements - why do states comply with their commitments? 
International environmental problems require deep cooperation 
among states.  Given the prevalence of physical, economic, and 
psychological externalities associated with environmentally harmful 
practices, cooperation is necessary to the realization of the mutual benefits 
of common solutions.59  Negotiated agreements, of course, only facilitate 
cooperation if states comply with them.  Furthermore, expectations about 
compliance will often constrain the depth of the commitments that states 
are willing to make - that is, the extent to which they are willing to depart 
from the course that they would have taken in the absence of cooperation. 
Just as in private contract situations, states need to be able to rely on 
credible commitments by other states, especially when the contemplated 
activities are highly reciprocal.  A state party may not be willing to embark 
on a path of costly pollution control, for example, without highly credible 
commitments from peer states that they will make the same sacrifices. 
David Victor blames the shallowness of international environmental law 
generally on the failure of efforts to develop effective compliance 
mechanisms.60 
The risk of defection in the environmental context is generally quite 
high.  Because of scientific and economic uncertainty, the costs and benefits 
of cooperation are difficult to predict and assess ex ante.  Moreover, this 
uncertainty is magnified by the long duration of cooperation that is often 
necessary to deal effectively with serious environmental problems. 
Similarly, political economy models predict that compliance with 
environmental commitments will be inconsistent.61  The costs of 
59. For a basic game theoretic discussion of payoff configurations and
international cooperation, see KENNETH A. OYE, EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER 
ANARCHY: HYPOTHESES AND STRATEGIES 6-9 (1985). 
60. David Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global
Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 148 (1999-2000). 
61. See generally Joseph R. Bial, Daniel Houser & Gary D. Libecap, Public Choice
Issues in Collective Action: Constituent Group Pressures and International Global Warming 
Regulation, International Center for Economic Research Working Paper, June 20, 2000. 
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environmental regulation are typically highly concentrated, so that regulated 
sectors - industry groups in particular - have strong incentives to oppose 
compliance over time.  The benefits of regulation, by contrast, are typically 
diffuse.  Beneficiaries face higher transaction costs in organizing in favor of 
compliance, and high levels of political mobilization may be unsustainable 
over the long term.  As Sunstein argues, the fact that environmental 
commitments are concluded at all often has to do with the “availability 
heuristic.”62  By this reasoning, environmental regulation has more 
widespread appeal when environmental harms are more “cognitively 
available” - when vivid and salient examples are present in the popular 
consciousness.  As the cognitive availability of environmental harms fades, 
popular support for costly regulatory measures - and thus for compliance 
with environmental agreements that compel such measures - tends to fade 
as well. 
Given these challenges, how can the advocates of international 
environmental cooperation ensure compliance with negotiated agreements? 
A wide variety of explanations have been advanced to explain observed 
compliance.  They need not be viewed as mutually exclusive; more likely, 
each of these mechanisms contributes in some respect to state compliance. 
The leading explanations include the reputational costs of defection,63 the 
perceived fairness and legitimacy of negotiated agreements,64 social 
learning,65 and administrative capacity-building, both bilateral and 
multilateral.66  Transnational legal process theorists, such as Harold Koh and 
Anne Marie Slaughter, predict greater compliance stemming from 
interactions - direct and indirect - between the legal institutions, broadly 
understood, of different countries.67 
Other theorists are far less sanguine about the prospects for 
compliance with international agreements in the face of changing 
conditions.  Goldsmith and Posner have famously argued that the discipline 
62. Cass Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Climate Change, John M. Olin Law & Economics Program at the University of Chicago, 
Working Paper No. 263, at 5-7 (2005). 
63. See, e.g., George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and
International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. S95 (2002); ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984). 
64. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
65. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
66. H. K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Compliance with International
Environmental Accords. 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995). 
67. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181
(1996); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1103 (2000); see also 
Jennifer Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003). 
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of international law mistakes correlation for causation.68  They argue that the 
behaviors that international lawyers take to be manifestations of opinio juris 
are actually no more than states acting in their own interests.  Pursuit of the 
national interest, they suggest, happens to produce consistent behaviors, at 
most times and in most places, which are mistaken for legal norms. 
Relatedly, David Victor and Kal Raustiala have questioned whether 
international law - as opposed to international political processes, 
culminating in so-called “soft law” - contributes meaningfully to 
compliance.69 They point to several instances of highly effective 
environmental cooperation among states on the basis of non-legally binding 
agreements, and reason that nations may be more likely to agree to robust 
monitoring regimes when the commitments at stake are not legally binding. 
The accounts of compliance with international law that accord the 
most weight to direct enforceability of commitments in domestic legal 
systems are liberal theories, which focus on the distinctive domestic 
institutions of so-called “liberal states.”  Thus, according to David Victor, 
there are certain states - liberal democracies - ”in which internal public 
pressure [and] robust legal systems make it possible to enforce 
international commitments from the inside (ground-up) rather than the 
outside (top-down).”70  
None of these, however, pays much heed to the potential for domestic 
courts to play a role in escaping the compliance dilemma.  Even liberal 
theories tend to focus instead on interest groups and on the operations of 
the political branches.71  Victor identified the existence of independent 
judiciaries as one of three factors explaining heightened compliance with 
international obligations by liberal states, but left the idea unexplored.  He 
emphasized that “[m]ore work is needed to unravel [the] conditions under 
which they are most effective.”72  
68. Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 63, 69-70 (1999). 
69. David G. Victor, The Use and Effectiveness of Nonbinding Instruments in the
Management of Complex International Environmental Problems, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
241, 246 (1997); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 659 
(David G. Victor et al. eds.) (1998). 
70. Victor, supra note 60 at 148.
71. Peter F. Cowhey, Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International
Commitments: Japan and the United States, in THEORY AND STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 399 (Charles Lipson & Benjamin J Cohen, eds.) (1999), is an effort 
to explain U.S. commitment with international obligations in terms of domestic 
institutions, but no mention is made of the role of the judiciary. Kal Raustiala, 
Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation Comparative Responses to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, WORLD POLITICS 482 (1997), similarly excludes courts 
from its institutional analysis. 
72. Victor, supra note 60, at 158.
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Oona Hathaway offers empirical support for the hypothesis that 
domestic legal enforcement contributes meaningfully to compliance with 
international obligations.73  After reviewing a range of studies, both 
qualitative and quantitative, that assess compliance with human rights law, 
she reaches two conclusions that are relevant here.  First, states that boast 
independent judiciaries, media, and political parties are more likely to join 
treaties when their human rights practices are good, and are more likely to 
improve their practices upon joining.74  In other words, they take their 
international legal obligations seriously.  Second, just as domestic 
enforcement contributes to international compliance, the existence of 
“robust domestic rule-of-law institutions” tends to strengthen domestic 
enforcement.75  Hathaway concludes, therefore, that work to strengthen local 
rule of law serves the ultimate goal of compliance with international human 
rights agreements.76 
In the environmental context, the compliance-reinforcing potential of 
domestic enforcement mechanisms is particularly pronounced.  In the 
United States, citizen suits have been tremendously effective at forcing 
executive compliance, at both the federal and state levels, with the major 
federal environmental statutes.  James May offers this assessment:  
Citizen suits work; they have transformed the environmental 
movement, and with it, society.  Citizen suits have secured 
compliance by myriad agencies and thousands of polluting 
facilities, diminished pounds of pollution produced by the 
billions, and protected hundreds of rare species and thousands 
of acres of ecologically important land.  The foregone monetary 
value of citizen enforcement has conserved innumerable agency 
resources and saved taxpayers billions.77 
Citizen suits are a staple of federal environmental law: nearly every 
major environmental statute imparts a private right of action to citizens.78  
And nearly 75 percent  of all actions to enforce domestic environmental laws 
take the form of citizen suits.79  Steps to make the environmental treaty 
obligations of the executive branch enforceable by citizen suit, therefore, 
may be expected to improve compliance. 
73. Oona Hathaway, The New Empiricism in Human Rights: Insights and Implications,
98 AM. SOC. INT’L. L. PROC. 206 (2004). 
74. Id. at 208.
75. Id. at 210.
76. Id.
77. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30,
10 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 3-4 (2003). 
78. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 165-66, n. 11.
79. May, supra note 77, at 6-7.
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Two overarching approaches to enforcement of international 
commitments by citizen suit are possible.  First, environmental agreements 
could be made to include more specific, self-executing obligations, from the 
outset.80  Alternatively, international agreements could continue to adhere 
to the model common to the Montreal and Kyoto protocols, whereby states 
commit to broad quantitative reductions, only now with an additional treaty 
obligation to provide for private enforcement of subsequent implementing 
legislation in the domestic legal system.  Although this latter option would 
leave some margin for noncompliance, that margin would be highly 
circumscribed.  Most noncompliance with environmental obligations is not 
through overt repudiation at the level of the executive or national 
legislature, but through non-enforcement.81  Thus, whether international 
environmental agreements themselves create privately enforceable rights or 
those provisions are instead inserted later at the time of passage of 
implementing legislation by the legislature, the availability of citizen suits 
will greatly diminish the opportunity for states subsequently to renege 
through inaction on their commitments.82  The key is to harness the 
enforcement potential of citizen suits in service of international compliance. 
This strategy is further recommended by the fact that domestic courts 
may be particularly well-suited, in institutional terms, to the task of long-
term enforcement in the environmental context.  Independent judiciaries 
are, in part by definition, more insulated from politics than the executive 
and the legislature, which means that they are also insulated from some of 
the most dangerous biases of political actors: short-termism, tendency to 
undervalue low-risk events, and unwillingness to face up to catastrophic 
risk.83  Yet, generally speaking, domestic courts are not so insulated from the 
political tenor of a country so as to fail to perceive the costs of compliance.84  
Hence, they offer a solution to the vexing trade-off between credibility and 
80. For more on the problem of self-execution of treaty obligations, see Lucy
Reed, Treaties in U.S. Domestic Law: Medellin v. Texas in Context, talk delivered to the 
Malaysian Chapter of the Asian Society of International Law and the Malaysian 
Society of International Law (2008), at 3-4. 
81. Chantal Thomas, Trade-Related Labor and Environmental Agreements?, 5 J. INT’L.
ECON. L. 791, 794, (2002). 
82. It may be useful to clarify that these recommendations are distinct from
proposals to create third-party beneficiaries to international agreements.  See Avnita 
Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A Paradigm for a Changing 
World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159 (2006); Bradley N. Lewis, Biting Without Teeth: 
The Citizen Submission Process and Environmental Protection, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1229 (2007).  
The former concern the fora in which rights are vindicated, while the latter concern 
the source or existence of the right.  
83. See generally William F. Shughart II, Katrinanomics: The Politics and Economics of
Disaster Relief, 127 PUB. CHOICE 31 (2006). 
84. For an argument that environmental questions belong in the courts, see
Nash, supra note 22. 
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flexibility faced by the framers of international agreements in which 
environmental commitments - with their uncertain long-term costs - are at 
issue.  What a country wants is to be bound when the question is close - so 
as to be able to make a credible commitment - but not when, from their 
perspective, circumstances have changed so much as to excuse 
noncompliance.85  States are understandably wary of trusting foreign or 
international authorities to recognize and accommodate such instances of 
changed circumstances.  A domestic institution is more likely to do so, even 
in cases of true judicial independence, simply by virtue of shared 
background assumptions that inhere in national identity and culture. 
Maximizing the extent to which international environmental commitments 
can make use of domestic legal institutions, therefore, may allow for optimal 
pre-commitment strategies. 
In addition to being highly effective, domestic enforcement of 
international environmental commitments is likely to be more politically 
palatable, at the stage of institutional design and ratification, than the 
alternatives.86  Existing international agreements in this area are notable for 
their lack of monitoring, sanctions, and other international oversight 
mechanisms.87  In the United States, at least, concerns about loss of 
national sovereignty to international institutions are highly politically 
salient, and often carried to irrational, even paranoid, extremes.88  Thus, 
political resistance to foreign and international monitoring and sanctions 
regimes often goes far beyond what one would expect given the simple risk 
that those institutions will be insufficiently attentive to national interests in 
hard cases.  This resistance means that any achievements in international 
oversight often come at the expense of the depth of the commitments 
made.89  In the environmental context, therefore, provision for domestic 
judicial enforcement of international commitments may be a Goldilocks 
solution: just enough precommitment, without the steep political price 
upfront. 
Such a strategy, however, is closely bound up with the difficult 
questions about standing doctrine that were discussed in Part I.  A 
85. The concept is analogous to the doctrine of impossibility in the common
law of contract. 
86. Roger Fisher recognized that “[a] government would rather be told what
to do by its own courts than by a foreign or international court.”  IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (Robert Kogod Goldman, ed.) (1981). 
87. Victor, supra note 60, at 163.
88. For a taste of these concerns about sovereignty, see Andrew T. Guzman &
Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1693, 1694-95 
(2008).  
89. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
581, 609 (2005) (exploring the complex trade-offs between oversight mechanisms, 
legality, and depth). 
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hospitable doctrine of standing is among the conditions necessary for 
making domestic courts an effective tool in ensuring compliance with 
international environmental agreements.  If, instead, standing doctrine 
continues to constrict the environmental citizen suits that make it into 
court, these compliance benefits will be commensurately foregone. 
Ironically, standing doctrine will sweep most broadly in excluding citizen 
enforcement in a substantive area such as environmental law where the 
achievement of international cooperation was already highly challenging.  In 
a further irony, the imminence and causation requirements of restrictive 
standing doctrine will make domestic enforcement most difficult to attain 
precisely when international institutions are most in need of support from 
domestic sources of compliance pressure: at the early stages of cooperation 
to address an incipient environmental problem. 
Climate change is the prime example of these risks, but the mismatch 
between standing doctrine and the substance of international 
environmental cooperation is institutional; it has the potential to extend far 
beyond the particular problem of climate change.  Other environmental 
regimes promise even less concrete, more diffuse, and longer-term benefits 
from regulation.  For example, failure of states to heed commitments 
directed towards preserving biodiversity will often fail to implicate any 
plaintiffs in particular.90  What American has an “injury-in-fact,” as 
interpreted by Justice Scalia, when an agency fails to take action to preserve 
the genetic diversity of obscure insects, plant species, or microorganisms, 
the use value of which to humans is almost nonexistent in the short or 
medium term?91  Another highly problematic example is explored by Paul 
Hawken, Amory Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins in Natural Capitalism.92  Several 
European countries have made great strides in reducing demand for natural 
resources and supply of solid waste by imposing responsibility for disposal 
and other “full life-cycle costs” on the manufacturers of consumer durables 
and industrial products.  But when the environmental goods and services 
conserved by European states are freely traded, other economies can free-
ride off of their efforts.  If the United States agreed by treaty to impose 
similar requirements on manufacturers, what citizens would have standing 
to challenge executive noncompliance with resulting legislation?  
The doctrine of Article III standing has profound and far-reaching 
consequences for United States participation in international regimes to 
address the pressing environmental problems of today and tomorrow.  If 
standing doctrine remains restrictive, unpredictable, and immune to 
90. For information on the Convention on Biological Diversity, see
http://www.cbd.int/. 
91. See DAVID PEARCE, ECONOMIC VALUES AND THE NATURAL WORLD (1993).
92. PAUL HAWKEN, ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
107-10 (1999).
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alteration by Congress, the international environment will pay part of the 
price. 
IV. Credibility as Negotiating Advantage
The course of United States standing doctrine, of course, will not
directly influence the enforceability of internationally agreed-upon 
environmental rules within other countries.  Therefore, one might 
legitimately question the extent to which a change in the domestic law of 
one state - even that of a hegemonic power - will meaningfully affect the 
prospects for effective international coordination.93  
One response to such criticism is that removing one obstacle to 
greater reliance on domestic enforceability in international environmental 
regimes is a step in the right direction.  As Justice Stevens reasoned in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, that a step is incremental does not defeat its utility.94  
But there also is a separate, stronger response: More robust domestic 
enforcement will strengthen the hand of the United States in international 
negotiations, whether or not other countries move in the same direction. 
The academic literature surrounding negotiation has a tendency to 
analyze the concept of credibility in the context of threats.  That is, in 
bargaining over the spoils within a zone of possible agreement, the party 
that is able to tie its own hands or burn its bridges (or create the credible 
impression of having done so), alters (or obscures) its true bottom line.  By 
threatening to walk away from the table, that party captures a greater share 
of the mutual benefits from agreement.95  But as I explain, the capacity to 
make credible promises is also an asset in negotiation.  
The weakening of domestic enforcement of environmental law renders 
less valuable the promises made by U.S. negotiators,96 by the following 
chain of causation: More restrictive environmental standing hinders 
domestic judicial enforcement, which in turn makes defection by the 
executive more likely, which drives negotiating partners to discount the 
value of promised actions by the (increased) likelihood of defection, thereby 
93. David Victor has made this argument explicitly in the context of climate
change: “international cooperation on prices and quantities that is restricted to 
[liberal] nations is unlikely to slow global warming by much, because those states 
account for a declining fraction of the emissions that cause global warming.” Victor, 
supra note 60, at 148. 
94. 549 U.S. at 524.
95. See, e.g., W. Howard Wriggins, Up For Auction: Malta Bargains with Great
Britain, 1971, 232-33, in THE FIFTY PERCENT SOLUTION: HOW TO BARGAIN SUCCESSFULLY WITH
HIJACKERS, STRIKERS, BOSSES, OIL MAGNATES, ARABS, RUSSIANS, AND OTHER WORTHY
OPPONENTS IN THIS MODERN WORLD (I.W. Zartman, ed.) (1976). 
96. Or, to be precise, it removes a range of highly credible promises from the
options available to the American negotiator. 
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rendering U.S. promises less valuable.  As a result, the U.S. is able to get 
less in exchange for its promises in international environmental 
negotiations. 
Many scholars, however, emphasize the value of flexibility in 
international agreements, particularly in situations of uncertainty.97  An 
advocate of restrictive standing might, in reliance on these analyses, argue 
that the gain in flexibility to the United States is worth the cost in terms of 
lost credibility.  But the hypothesized Lujan apologist would be wrong. 
Weakened enforcement by the domestic courts serves only to narrow the 
range of options available to the political branches in the international 
arena.  Whereas a state that is able to make credible promises can calibrate 
the value of a promise by varying its substantive content as it wishes, a state 
lacking credibility is limited in what it can (effectively, credibly) promise.  In 
other words, a state in possession of credibility can still enjoy the benefits of 
flexibility, but the reverse is not true. 
Strategies of pre-commitment like domestic enforceability may be 
particularly useful to hegemonic powers like the United States.  Hegemons 
of course, have a strong interest in preservation of the status quo.  While 
ascendant political forces in the United States have, up to the present, 
identified the interests of the status quo as in conflict with concerted global 
action to deal with environmental problems, that position may no longer be 
tenable.  Climate change and other looming ecological crises - not the 
efforts to deal with them - in fact pose the greater existential threat to the 
current global order, and American political elites are beginning to 
understand the need to address them.  Thus, the nominees of both major 
American political parties expressed strong rhetorical support for efforts to 
deal with climate change in 2008, and a comprehensive cap-and-trade bill 
passed the House, but not the Senate, in 2009.98  For a hegemonic power to 
convince other states to cooperate on its terms, however, it must be able to 
make credible commitments.  Otherwise, the world will remain all too aware 
of the power of the hegemon to renege after the fact.99 
The U.S.’s need for credibility on the world stage derives not only from 
97. GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC
UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995).  Kal Raustiala 
suggests that nonlegal “pledges” are an undervalued tool in international relations, 
in large part because of the flexibility that they offer to states.  Raustiala, supra note 
89, at 591-92. 
98. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).  
99. Peter F. Cowhey argues that this “top dog problem” plagues all great
power commitments, but also that the difficulty is particularly intractable in 
multilateral regimes. Domestic Institutions and International Commitments, in THEORY AND
STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 400 (Charles Lipson & Benjamin J. 
Cohen, eds.) (1999). 
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structural factors.  Though America’s image in the world has rebounded 
substantially since the election of President Obama,100 it was held in much 
lower esteem just one year ago.101  And its perceived flouting of international 
norms was an important contributor to that decline.102  The Bush 
administration’s salient decisions to opt out of multilateral efforts, including 
“unsigning” the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and non-participation in 
the Kyoto process are unlikely to be completely overlooked by global leaders 
considering long-term reciprocal cooperation with the United States, 
Obama’s recent charm offensives notwithstanding.  
The international community is painfully aware of the periodic 
willingness of the political branches - particularly the executive - in the 
United States to spurn international obligations when interests so dictate. 
Many point out, however, that these manifestations of United States 
“exceptionalism” consisted not in noncompliance - violation of a binding 
legal norm - but rather in perfectly legal decisions to opt out of international 
processes.103  The point is true for what it is worth, but prominent instances 
of U.S. noncompliance with binding legal norms are, nonetheless, fairly easy 
to identify. 
One of these instances of noncompliance is the requirement of 
consular notification in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.104  In 
Medellin v. Texas,105 the Supreme Court held that the state of Texas was not 
bound to refrain from executing Ernesto Medellin, even though the United 
States was indisputably in breach of its obligations under that treaty.106  
Domestic considerations of federalism and procedural default, therefore, 
trumped international compliance, much to the dismay of Mexico and many 
others in the international community.107  Domestic procedural law also, 
100. See Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World, Pew Global
Attitudes Project, available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1289/global-attitudes-
survey-2009-obama-lifts-america-image (last visited 2/25/10). 
101. See America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas, Pew
Global Attitudes Project, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php? 
PageID=825 (last visited 2/25/10). 
102. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Bush Doctrine: The Dangers of American
Exceptionalism in a Revolutionary Age, 27 ASIAN PERSP. 183 (2003). 
103. E.g., Sabrina Safrin, The Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 1307, 1313 (2008). 
104. See generally Reed, supra note 80.
105. 552 U.S. 491 (2008)
106. Id.
107. See Warren Richey, Showdown Over a Texas Execution, The Christian Science
Monitor, July 31, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0731/p03s05-
usju.html (“It threatens to undercut US standing in the world by suggesting a lack of 
respect for the ICJ, analysts say.”). 
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arguably, trumped international obligations for some time in the case of the 
prisoners of the war on terror held at Guantanamo.  With respect to those 
individuals, the protections of the Geneva Conventions were undone - or at 
least very significantly delayed - by the jurisdictional requirements of U.S. 
law.108  Comprehensive treatment of these controversies is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but the basic point is clear: the U.S.’s prospective negotiating 
partners are likely to be attentive to the risk that procedural hurdles - like 
strict standing - will undermine U.S. compliance in the environmental arena 
as well. 
V. Conclusion
Several unresolved questions about Article III standing have important
implications for the viability and effectiveness of citizen suits in 
environmental cases.  If courts continue the recent trend of allowing 
procedural doctrines to restrict these suits, the shift may have important 
international repercussions which have not yet been fully reckoned with. 
Most important among these is that the unavailability of domestic 
enforcement of environmental laws through citizen suits will tend to 
undermine compliance with international environmental obligations.  Both 
the negotiating position of the United States and the prospects for effective 
cooperation on the most pressing environmental issues facing humanity will 
suffer accordingly. 
108. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1013 (2008).
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*  *  *
